Israeli officials intercepted Hamas’ battle plans for the Oct. 7 massacre more than a year before the attack, but rejected the plan as too complex and ambitious for the terror group to implement, it said.
Since October 7, when some 1,200 people were killed, Israeli security officials have acknowledged intelligence and security failures that led to the attack. Kippur War.
The roughly 40-page document, codenamed “The Wall of Jericho” by Israeli officials, systematically outlines the step-by-step strategy Hamas will pursue to overwhelm Israel’s border defenses and build cities and military bases to attack near the Gaza Strip. New York Times.
While no date was given for the attack, it described how the rocket attack would be followed by drone strikes that would destroy surveillance cameras and automatic machine guns on guard towers along the Israel-Gaza border before hordes of militants appeared on the border. Paragliders, motorcycles and pedestrians poured through the gates. This is exactly what happened on October 7, when Israeli soldiers and civilians found themselves completely exposed and defenseless.
The level of detail also raised questions about whether there were leaks from Israeli security services. The document contains detailed information about the location and strength of the Israel Defense Forces, communications centers and other confidential information.
The main goal set out in the document was to capture the Reim military base, where the unit responsible for guarding the area is stationed. Hamas realized this goal on October 7 and captured part of the base.
The translated draft has been widely circulated among Israeli military and intelligence officials and leaders, but is believed to be far beyond Hamas’ capabilities, the newspaper reported.
Citing evidence such as documents, emails and interviews, the report said the Israeli government believed Hamas would not dare carry out such an attack either because the belief was so deeply ingrained that officials ignored evidence to the contrary.
It is unclear whether Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, or other senior politicians knew about this document. Last month he criticized his intelligence agencies, saying they did not warn him about the attack: “At no time was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned of Hamas’ military intentions.”
“On the contrary, all security officials, including the head of army intelligence and the head of the Shin Bet, suggested that Hamas was restrained and interested in reaching an agreement.”
Ronen Bar, director of Israel’s domestic intelligence service Shin Bet, took responsibility for the failure to prevent the attack.
“Despite a number of measures we took on Saturday, unfortunately we were not able to create enough warning to prevent the attack,” he said. “As the head of the organization, the responsibility for this lies with me. There will be time for research. Now we fight.”
Respectively New York TimesShortly after Israel intercepted the construction plan, representatives of the Gaza military branch tasked with protecting the southern border said Hamas’ goals were unclear. “It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be implemented,” the military assessment said.
In July, three months before the attack, an analyst with Israel’s intelligence unit 8200 warned that Hamas had conducted a one-day exercise similar to the plan.
According to the encrypted emails, a colonel in the Gaza division dismissed their concerns. The analyst responded by email. “I strongly disagree that this scenario is imaginary.” She noted that Hamas’s teachings are fully consistent with “the content of the Wall of Jericho.”
“This is a plan to start a war,” she said. “This is not just an attack on a village.”
The Israeli army and the Israeli Security Service, which is responsible for fighting terrorism in Gaza, did not comment on the situation.